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MICHIGAN
LAW REVIEW
VOL. XIX FEBRUARY, 1921 No. 4
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LEGAL RIGHT
T IS a common experience with a teacher of law to find in every
department of the subject a number of hard knots that have re-
sisted all the efforts of the courts and jurists to split them. These
usually take the form of a hopeless contrariety of decisions, or of
decisions which are impeccable in their logic but offend against what
we usually speak of as a sense of natural justice. It is customary
for us to dismiss these with a statement that the majority of de-
cisions or the weight of authority favors the one conclusion or the
other, and that possibly the only ,way to remedy the difficulty is by
an appeal to the legislature. There seems to be a larger number of
these refractory knots piled up in the subject of Damages than in
other courses, and this is an attempt to reduce their number. It has
been somewhat surprising and not a little disconcerting to find that
so many of them depend upon simple logical fallacies. If the wrong
horn of a dilemma is originally taken by a supreme court, its decision
becomes a precedent from which its successors have difficulty in
escaping. As this solution seems to be so very easy, it is here pre-
sented with due diffidence, and with deprecation of the charge of
contempt of court. It is simply the observation that in our never
ending struggle to steer between the two categorical legal necessities,
certainty and flexibility, the courts have inclined toward the former
where, without the violation of any legal principle, they might well
have turned to the latter.
The emphasis on the study of cases during the last half century
has had the revivifying and stimulating influence upon the science
of law which is characteristic of every return to the sources. Be-
cause of this simple change in the method of approach we have made
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our law more scientific, and whether the term be used 
as a reproach
or a commendation, all of us, both theorists and practitioners, 
for
better or for worse, have become case lawyers, in that 
we all believe
that law is the body of rules recognized or acted upon 
in courts of
justice. But we have frequently gone astray by following 
the rule
without recognizing that return to the sources means 
a constantly
repeated recurrence to the particular source, for the 
purpose of
formulating new rules for the enforcement of steadily 
developing
rights. A rule, a definition, or a maxim of law, established 
by a
decision of the sixteenth century, under the 
influence of our theory
of stare decisis and of the syllogizing tendency so prevalent 
in the
courts affected by eighteenth century philosophy, may 
become a pre-
cedent for deciding a case which involves elements entirely 
different
from those on the basis of which the rule was originally 
established.
We have here the old familiar fallacy of the Schoolmen. 
"Man is
a featherless biped," but "a plucked chicken is a featherless 
biped";
ergo, "a plucked chicken is a man." An unassailable 
conclusion, if
we admit the validity of our major premise. And the 
only way to
remedy this grotesque conclusion is to make a more careful 
analysis
of the essential characteristics of man and, by a process of 
induc-
tion, to form a more accurate definition which may then 
be used as
a corrected major'premise.
As late as the middle of the nineteenth century the English 
court
held that the word "annexation" could have only its original 
gram-
matical connotation; i. e., bound together in some material 
way, as
by clamps or cement, because that had been the meaning in 
the six-
teenth century." According to this decision the Statue of 
Liberty,
though weighing many tons would not be annexed to its 
base, if
there were no physical interlocking of the material particles 
of the
statue and the base. If annexation means interlocking, then, 
if there
is no interlocking, there is no annexation. By starting with 
the defi-
nition as a major premise and proceeding deductively we 
reach in-
evitably a logical conclusion, which may or may not properly 
deter-
'Wiltshear v. Cottrell (1853), 1 E. & B., 2 Q. B. 674. Cf. note on 
"Epi-
thetical Jurisprudence and the Annexation of Fixtures," 18 
MICH. L. Rev.
4o7. It should be acknowledged that Professor Evans Holbrook 
was the
first to apply the term "Epithetical Jurisprudence" to this peculiar 
reasoning.
Dean Pound has discussed the phenomenon at considerable 
length in his
article on "Mechanical Jurisprudence" 8 CoL. L. Riiv. 605.
RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL RIGHT
mine the rights of the parties to the litigation. If, on the other hand,
we start with all the facts in the controversy and proceed inductively
to determine which party has the legal right to the property, we
satisfy the reasonable expectations entertained by the parties as to
the subsequent disposal of the chattel when they put it in place, and
incidentally we establish a new rule of law; namely, that affixing by
gravity is "annexation." That the latter process is just as legal as
the former, is shown by the fact that the New York court, in the
very next year, decided that "a thing may be as firmly fixed to the
land by gravitation as -by clamps or cement."2
This reliance upon the rule of law to the exclusion of any effort
to determine the rights of the parties is more.marked in the subject
of Damages than in some other fields. Doubtless because we have
in this branch of adjective law a gradual building up of rules of
substantive law on the basis of-specific sets of facts. Jurymen were
originally summoned because they had been witnesses of the trans-
action out of which the dispute had arisen, and were therefore the
most capable of passing upon the matter. But when their verdict
was crystallized in a judgment, this, almost of necessity, became a
rule of law for deciding analogous cases, and would be followed as
a precedent 3 But whenever a case involving a slightly different set
of facts was decided under the old and narrower rule, we would get
a decision that might or might not be just. What we need then to
establish the right under the new set of circumstances, is a new in-
duction from the broader or different state of facts. With this
simple device a good many of the puzzles in the subject of Damages
'Snedeker v. Waring (1854), 12 N. Y. i7o, x75. It is perhaps worthy
of note that the New York court decided this point correctly because it
resorted to the Roman Law for its principle of decision. Vor a similar help-
ful use of the Roman texts, see the article by Dean Pound on "Juristic Sci-
ence and the Law," 31 HARV. L. Rzv. io49. 'This litigation of a word rather
than the determination of the rights of the parties as dependent upon their
intention has been a marked feature of the discussion of "trade fixtures" in
the English courts. In the case of Whitehead v. Bennett (i858), 27 L. J.,
Ch. 474, the court said there is a "broad distinction between trade fixtures
and buildings used in trade." On the other hand, the United States court
has said, in Van Ness v. Packard (1889), 2 Pet. (U. S.), 137, that buildings,
"if designed for purposes of trade," could be removed.
I If this had not happened we never should have arrived at a law of
damages; each verdict would have rested upon its own facts. Cf. SEDGwicx,
E, MNTS OF THn LAw or DAMAGS, p. 3.
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may be solved and some apparently hopeless contradictions may thus
be reconciled.
In many instances the difficulties produced by the stress upon
deduction rather than upon induction have been solved by the courts
themselves, after they have recognized that the syllogistic reasoning
has brought them to conclusions that are not in accord with justice.
There was no recovery for mental suffering at common law.
5 In
the case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., the plaintiff, a pregnant
woman, was standing on the street, waiting for a car. A horse car
of the defendant was driven close to the plaintiff, so that she stood
between the horses' heads. Because of the fright and excitement she
became tinconscious and suffered a miscarriage and consequent ill-
ness. The court in deciding that she could not recover said, "Assum-
ing that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvious that
no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom." The fol-
lowing seems to be the reasoning of the court: Major premise,
fright as a cause of action is zero. (As authority for this we have
the case of Lynch v. Knight, cited in Note 5, (supra), also the im-
posing line of authorities quoted by counsel for the respondent in
this New York case.) Minor premise, ex nihilo nihil fit. (See,
LucImzlus, Di RERUm NATuRA, 1-159, first century before Christ.
This of course goes back to the source used 'by Lucretius, namely,
Epicurus, fourth century B. C., a venerable precedent). Ergo, the
"It may be remarked that the contradictory decisions are simply the sur-
face indications of the deeper antinomy with which the courts are constantly
struggling. Law must be certain, otherwise men would never know how
their cases are to be judged, but it is just as necessary that law should be
flexible, in order that it may secure a constantly developing justice under
eyer-changing conditions, and it is the business of courts, lawyers and jurists
to reconcile this antinomy. This is, in a way, the peculiar function of the
scientific jurist. The courts must decide cases and clear their dockets; law-
yers must win their suits; it is the business of the jurisconsult to solve these
problems.
"'Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to
redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." Lord
Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight (i861), 9 H. of L. Cas, 577.
'Court of Appeals of New York (1896), 15I N. Y. 1o7. Cf. Proceedings
of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, p. 13o, note 2. In the case of Spade v. Lynn, 168 Mass. 285 (I897),
the Massachusetts court followed the New York court in its decision, but
avoided this logical pitfall in its reasoning.
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result is zero. Q. E. D.-but it is wrong, because zero is used in the
sense of a cause of action and not in the sense of the proximate
cause of an injury. The fallacy of this reasoning has been pointed
out since by the English court, in a case in which the facts were
practically identical with those in the New York case, (supra). If
we approach this case, not through the rule of law, which is to be
followed as a precedent, but from the standpoint of the legal right
invaded, we start with an acknowledged legal wrong, the negligent
act of the defendant. This is the proximate cause of the fright,
which in turn induces the miscarriage, the injury complained of and
proved. The chain of causation is complete, the fright being a con-
necting link between the wrongful act alleged and the proved detri-
ment to the plaintiff."
A SPURIOUS CANON OV INTZRPR4TATION
Aside from these cases where the courts have successfully extri-
cated themselves from their difficulties by a process legally and logi-
cally unassailable, there is an interesting line of cases in which the
same end has been accomplished by the invention of what seems to
be a spurious rule of interpretation. In the ninth edition of Svn,-
wicK ON DAMAGES, at the end of the discussion of the canons of
interpretation for distinguishing liquidated damages from penalty,
an extra section is added on "Valuation and Pre-ascertainment."
' '
From its position in the text it would seem that this is inserted as a
new canon of interpretation and it is apparently so used in subsequent
cases in the United States courts.1 0 During the Spanish-American
War the Sun Publishing Co. chartered a yacht from one Moore, for
Dulieu v. White [igo1], 2 K. B. 669.
'SmGwicx, ELmmsNTs or" DAxAGi, p. 113. "The true view would seem
to have been at length reached in Duheu v. White and Simone v. Rhode
Island, that negligence producing fright is not enough; that some material
damage must be proved; that this material damage must be proximately
caused by the negligence, and that fright may be one of the links in the chain
of causation." See Janvier v. Sweeney [1919], 2 K. B. 316; also 18 MIcH.
L. Rzv. 332.
" StDwicK oN DAMACtS [gth Edition, 1912], revised by Arthur G. Sedg-
wick and Joseph H. Beale, Sec. 42oa. This section does not appear in the
8th Edition (i8gi), but seems to be added here as a new canon of interpre-
tation.
10 i8 Micir. L. Rev. 5o; Wise v. United States (May, i919), Adv. S. 343.
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the purpose. of gathering news in Cuban waters. The charter con-
tained a provision that "for the purposes of this charter the value of
the yacht" should "be considered and taken at the sum of $75,000."
1
The yacht was lost. In a suit for damages the supreme court decided
that evidence could not be admitted to show that the actfual value of
the yacht was less than that sum, thus holding that the libellant was
entitled to recover the whole sum of $75,000 as liquidated damages.
A few years later the House of Lords decided
2 that a provision in
a contract that "The penalty for later delivery (of a torpedo boat)
shall be at the rate of 5oo pounds per week," was to be regarded as
"liquidated damages and not as a penalty." Lord Robertson gave as
a reason for this decision that there had been in this case "a genuine
pre-estimate of the creditor's probable or possible interest in the
performance of the contract." In the case of the United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Co.," which was a suit for the breach of a contract
containing the provision that "the penalty for delay in the delivery"
of disappearing gun carriages should be at the rate of $35 a day,
the court decided that this was a provision for liquidated damages
and not for a penalty, and said further that "The principle decided
in that case" (Sun Publishing Co. Case) is much like the contention
of the government herein."
Some years ago'" attention was called to the fact that even before
this reference to the Sun Case by the court in the Bethleh'm Case,
the subordinate United States courts were citing the Sun Case as a
precedent for their decisions on a state of facts which was entirely
different from the facts in the Sun Case but identical with those in
the Clydebank Case and in the Bethlehem Case. As our standard
text on Damages 5 has brought the Sun Case and the Clydebank Case
under the rubric of "Valuation and Pre-asceitainment," we seem to
have established by the authority of the United States. Supreme
Court and the House of Lords a new canon of interpretation. But
that no new canon has been established seems quite evident when it
is recognized that the Sun Publishing Co. Case was decided on the
Sun Printing and Publishing Co. v. Moore (igoi), 183 U. S. 642.
Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Yzquierdo y Castaneda
[ipo5], A. C. 6.
11205 U. S. 105, 119.
19 MICH. L. Rv. s88, 591, note 14.
Cf. note 9, supra.
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simple principle of estoppel by contract, on an almost unique state of
facts; while the Clydebank Case, the Bethlehem Case, and all the
subsequent cases in the United States courts and the various State
courts, rest on the old canon of interpretation to the effect that
"where independently of the stipulation the damages would be un-
certain, or incapable, or very difficult of ascertainment, they may be
liquidated.""' All the cases in which this alleged new rule has been
invoked have -been decided correctly, but the confusion caused by
the appeal to the rule as a canon of interpretation has certainly not
added to the clarity and amelioration of our law. The deduction
from this spurious canon of interpretation as a new major premise
can only add to our bewilderment. The use of the terms "pre-
estimate," "pre-ascertainment," or "pre-valuation" adds nothing to
our knowledge nor do they aid in settling our hard cases. "No more
since than before the decisions by the United States Supreme Court
and the House of Lords, can the parties 'preascertain' and fix upon
what is actually a penalty under the guise of liquidated damages."'"
A SUPERFLUOUS CANON OP 1NTE.RPRETATION
As we have in the above instance the case of a spurious canon of
interpretation from which we make unwarranted deductions, so in
the subject of alternative contracts and liquidated damages we have
a superfluous canon of interpretation by which the cases are decided
deductively, by a process of purely grammatical interpretation,
whereas the inductive interpietation on the basis of the rights of the
parties, determined by their intention, will bring us to a rational con-
clusion and satisfy the demands of justice.
"The principle of alternative contracts has been much discussed,
but decisions directly in point are difficult to find," says Arthur
George Sedgwick.18 "The whole subject seems to be involved in a
good deal of difficulty," in the words of Theodore Sedgwick.Y9 It
is submitted that most of the difficulties would be brushed aside or
avoided, if the subject were approached from the standpoint of the
rights of the parties, determined from all the facts in the case, rather
than from the determination of the grammatical question as to
" SEDGWICK, ELMNTS OF Me LAW or DAMAGPS, p. 243.
"9 MIcH. L. Ray. 593.
"ELEMNTS OF THE LAW Or DAMAGES, p. 251.
SEDGWICK ON DAMAGFS [8th Edition], Sec. 424.
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whether the word "or" is a disjunctive conjunction or something
else. How difficult it is to find cases involving the principle of
alternative contracts, is shown by the fact that an English case from
the Court of Common Pleas is cited as the "leading case" on the
subject, and the decision in this case is by a divided court. The facts
in the case of Deverill v. BurneW
0 were that the plaintiff had shipped
from London to South America certain goods, to be delivered to
one-Bollaert there, on his accepting certain drafts drawn by the
plaintiff on him. The defendant was given the bills of lading and
the drafts, to remit the proceeds thereof, if the same were paid, and,
in case they should not be paid, "either to return them to the plaintiff
or pay him the amount thereof." The bills were found to be worth-
less, and, in a suit for the breach of the contract, a verdict was ren-
dered for a farthing damages. On a rehearing this was reversed
and a verdict was given for I07 pounds, the face of the drafts. A
dissent was expressed by Bovill, C. J. The argument in both
opinions was a purely grammatical one. The court in the prevailing
opinion said, "If, in the ordinary affairs of life, I say to a man, 'I
will return your horse tomorrow, or pay you a day's hire for him',
the only reasonable construction is that, if I do not return the horse,
I will pay a day's hire." Bovill, C. J., in the dissenting opinion said,
"we ought to construe the declaration strictly, and are not entitled to
substitute words which import a condition that one alternative shall
be performed, if the other is not, when the disjunctive conjunction
'or' being used, the natural meaning is a simple alternative." In
neither of these- statements is there any intimation that what the
parties mayhave intended by their agreement is of any importance.
A few years ago, in an attempt to decide this case on the basis of
the rights of the parties rather than upon the grammatical interpre-
tation of a -word, Captain Sealby, the hero of the steamship "Re-
public", was asked how that contract should be interpreted. He
promptly answered that according to the Custom of the Port of
London the sea-captain had guaranteed the collection of the bills of
exchange. This of course would make the recovery lO7 pounds
and not the farthing, the nominal value of the bills, and the verdict
would determine. the rights of the parties in accordance with their
reasonable expectations at the time the contract was made. It should
be noted, too, that this solution is strictly in accordance with law, in
"Court of Common Pleas (1873), L. R. 8, C. P. 475.
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this case the Custom of London, following the precedent set by Lord
Mansfield, who so often thus made the custom of merchants a part
of our common law.
CONTINUING TRESPASS AND RZP ATXD WRONG
One of the most troublesome questions arising from the "hard
decisioiis" that make our proverbial "bad law", is found in the
application of the statute of limitations to the doubly ambiguous
term "continuing trespass." Trespass in its primitive sense is an
intrusion upon one's possession, either of property or person. But
with the development of the action on the case, and particularly with
a liberal construction of actions under the code, a trespass comes to
be treated as an infringement upon one's right; i. e., a wrong, hence
it occurs that while a trespass is always a wrong, not every legal
wrong will be recognized by the courts as a trespass. The word
"continuing" also tends to become confused with the word "repeat-
ed." An illustration of this is found in some of the recent mal-
practice cases. A surgeon negligently sews up a sponge in a wound
and negligently allows it to remain there until after the statute of
limitations has run on the original negligent act. The question then
arises, is the injury produced from day to day by the foreign body
in the wound the result of the original wrongful act, and is the action
therefore barred by the running of the statute, or is there a new
injury each successive day caused by a fresh irritation, and can a
recovery be had for all injurious effects occurring within the statu-
tory period?
The National Copper Co. v. The Minnesota Mining Co.2 1 is one
of those hard cases which reaches a conclusion at variance with what
is ordinarily thought of as justice, but in which the court felt com-
pelled by the logic of the law and the force of precedent to so decide.
The Minnesota Co. blew a hole through the barrier left between its
mine and the National Mine. Afterwards the Minnesota Co.
"robbed" its mine and allowed the surface to cave in. Surface water
flowed into the Minnesota Mine and later passed through the hole
into the National Mine, which had been temporarily abandoned.
Years afterwards the National Co. was put to large expense in re-
moving this water, and therefore brought suit for damages caused
2(1885) 57 Mich. 83.
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by the flow of the water through the hole. It was held that there
could be no recovery because the Statute of Limitations had run on
the original trespass; namely, the breaking down of the barrier, and
that no further cause of action arose, either (i) from leaving the
hole, or (2) from allowing the water to flow into the plaintiff's mine.
This decision rested on a firmly established precedent
22 and has since
been followed without question,23 so that we may assume that it is
settled law, unless a flaw may be found in its logic. An Ohio case
involving the same principle but on a somewhat different state of
facts was decided in the same way after prolonged litigation.
24 The
facts in this Ohio case of Gillette v. Tucker were that Dr. Gillette,
after performing an operation on the abdomen of the plaintiff,
sewed up a, sponge in the wound, and allowed it to remain there for
many months. It was afterwards removed by another surgeon and
the plaintiff, Mrs. Tucker, brought suit for malpractice, more than
a year after the sponge was sewed up in the wound, but less than a
year after she had ceased to take treatment from Dr. Gillette. In
the common pleas court a decision was given for the defendant.
This was reversed -by the circuit -court of appeals, which gave a
decision for the plaintiff. The supreme court divided three to three,
thus affirming the decision of the circuit court, but several years
later, when the personnel of the supreme court had changed, it was
decided by a four to two vote, that the decision of the common pleas
court should prevail and that the decision of the circuit court should
be reversed.25 The Ohio Supreme Court thus finally denies a re-
covery to the plaintiff and puts this case of trespass to the person in
the same category with trespass to property, as in the Michigan case
"Clekg v. Dearden (1848), 12 Ad. & El. (N. S.), 575; Kansas Pac. Ry.
v. Mihlman (1876), 17 Kans. 224; Williams v. Pomeroy (1882), 37 Oh. St.
583; Farmers of Hampstead Water (17o1), 12 Mod. 519.
'Duff v. United States Gypsum Co. (191i), 189 Fed. Rep. 236. It is
said in this case that the dissenting opinion in Gillette v. Tucker has become
the law of the state of Ohio. But Cf. 87 Oh. St. 4o8, post, note 36.
'Gillette v. Tucker (i9O2), 67 Oh. St. lo6.
'McArthur v. Bowers (19o5), 72 Oh. St. 656. This view as to the law
of the case has since been adopted in Duff v. United States Gypsum Co.
(igii), 189 Fed. 236, and may perhaps be considered to represent the weight
of authority. The United States circuit court, in this last case, cited
National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co. (i885), 57 Mich. 83, and Wil-
liams v. Pomeroy (1882), 37 Oh. St. io6, as controlling precedents.
RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL RIGHT
of The National Copper Co. v. The Minnesota Mining Co. (supra).
It -had been asserted in this Michigan case that "the history of
mining upon Lake Superior will (not) disclose another instance of
such reckless disregard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner,"
and, although the logic of that case and of the precedents upon which
it was based seem irrefragable, we have abundant evidence that
neither the courts nor the legislatures have been satisfied with the
conclusion. In the case of Lewey v. The Fricke Coal Co.2 the de-
fendant, "while mining coal on its own land, pushed an entry or
passage under the plaintiff's lands and appropriated the coal re-
moved therefrom." Action was brought in trespass to recover dam-
ages for this unlawful mining. It was held that the statute began
to run not from the time of the original trespass but from the time
of the discovery by the plaintiff. The court said, "The discovery of
the fraud gives a new cause of action." 27 E converso, this would
seem to mean that each day's concealment of the wrong gives rise to
a new cause of action. The acceptance of this converse proposition
would, as will later be shown, give a way to reverse our hard
decisions that now seem so thoroughly established. The solution of
the difficulty by the Pennsylvania court in cases of injury to prop-
erty has been adopted by the Michigan court in cases of injury to
the person. In Groendal v. Westrate s the facts were that a physi-
cian had concealed from his patient the fact that her shoulder was
dislocated. The Michigan court held that a suit brought within two
years after she discovered the fact, was not barred by the Statute.
On a somewhat similar state of facts the California court has very
recently allowed a recovery where action was brought more than a
year after the initial negligent act of the surgeon, but within a year
after he had ceased to care for the case." It is believed, however,
that the theory held by the court in this last decision is not the same
as that of the Michigan court.
Although the injustice of the old decisions has thus been in part
remedied, their logic is as yet unimpeached. But it is believed that
" (1895) x66 Pa. St. 536.
'See Report, at p. 544-
" (1912) 171 Mich. 92. Decided under the provisions of MIcH. CoMP;
LAws or 1897, Sec. 9729, as amended by Act No. i68, Public Acts of 19o.
" Perkins v. Trueblood (Cal., May, 1919), 18i Pac. 642; Con- or Po-
crouRz oF CALIFORNA, Sec. 340, Subd. 3. Cf. 18 MICH. L. Rsy. 679.
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if deductions from a vague major premise be avoided and the cases
be approached inductively from the standpoint of the rights of the
parties under all the facts, the harsh operation of the Statute of
Limitations may be avoided, and, in accordance with a somewhat
attenuated and devious line of authority, the plaintiff may be given
a verdict in the cases, both of injuries to land and of injuries to
the person.
The facts in the English case of Clegg v. Dearden, (supra), and
in the Michigan case of The National Copper Co. v. Minnesota
Mining Co. (supra) , are identical. The wall of the plaintiff's
mine was broken through and, after the lapse of the statutory period,
water came in through the hole that was left, and injured the plain-
tiff. It was held in the English case that the defendant was 
not
liable for "omitting to close up the aperture on his neighbor's soil."
In the Michigan case it was held that "the flowing of the water
through the opening" was not "a new trespass." It is necessary that
each of these conclusions be examined in detail. In arguing the first
of the above points, in the case of Clegg v. Dearden, the English
court said, "there is a legal obligation to discontinue a trespass or re-
move a nuisance; but no such obligation upon a trespasser to replace
what he has pulled down or destroyed on the land of another, * * *
no cause of action arises from his omitting to re-enter the land and
fill up the excavation; such an omission is neither a continuation of
a trespass nor of a nuisance; nor is it a breach of a legal duty." The
theory of the court here seems to be that the hole is not a continuing
wrong from which a new cause of action will start from day to day,
but that the hole is rather the result of the original wrongful act,
as is argued by the Ohio court in the dissenting opinion in Gillette 
v.
Tucker, (supra) ,81 and that the first trespass together with all its
consequences is barred -by the statute. The Michigan court
3 2 an-
swered the argument as to the wrong in leaving the opening in plain-
tiff's mine by saying that "there is no analogy between leaving a hole
in a wall * * * and leaving * * * obstructions there." This last
statement rests on abundant precedent; for example, the court 
in
'Cf. notes 21 and 22, supra.
(igo2) 67 Oh. St. io6. It should be remembered that it was this dis-
.senting opinion that was finally adopted by the Ohio court in the later case
of McArthur v. Bowers. Cf. notes 24 and 25, supra.
'National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co. (1885), 57 Mich. 83.
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the case of Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Mihlmate3 says the doctrine of
continuous trespass cannot be extended beyond those cases "in which
something is carried to and placed on the land"; but nevertheless it
seems to embody a logical fallacy which afterwards arises to
confound us.
In what is called the prevailing opinion in Gillette v. Tucker,
which was, however, reversed in the later Ohio case of McArthur
v. Bowers,3' the court said that the failure to remove the sponge was
"a continuous and daily breach" of "a continuous obligation" to re-
move it, and cites the case of Perry County v. Railroad Co.,35 as
authority for its view. In this last case a bridge belonging to the
county was destroyed by the fault of the railroad company, in I871.
The commissioners restored the bridge, at a cost of $3000, in March,
i878, after the statute of limitations had run on the original wrong;
and, in October, 1882, the commissioners brought suit against the
railroad for damages in that amount. The court said, "IVrom the
time the injuries complained of were committed, * * * the duty of
the defendant to restore the bridge to its former condition of useful-
ness and safety was a continuing and subsisting obligation, and each
day's failure to make full restoration was a fresh breach of such
obligation, and lapse of* time cannot avail to interpose a bar to re-
covery." It should be noted that although the court says that the
principle in Perry County v. Railroad Co. is the same as that in
Gillette v. Tucker, the facts are very different, for while the hole left
in the road-bed by the destruction of the bridge and the sponge left
in the wound each gave rise to a continuous obligation to remedy the
wrong, the foreign body left in the wound was also a "repeated
wrong", in that it produced each day a new irritation and inflamma-
tion. The Perry County Case decides that leaving the hole was a
fresh wrong each day. The Gillette Case finally decides, after much
vacillation, that leaving the sponge in the wound was the result of
and a part of the original wrong of putting it there by a negligent
act. The consequence is that the final decision of the Ohio court in
the case of McArthur v. Bowers on the facts of the Gillette Case
does not affect the decision in the Perry County Case, which is on
an entirely different state of facts. Indeed the Ohio court in a late
(1876) 17 Kans. 224.
"C. note 3z, supra.
"(885) 43 Oh. St. 45r.
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case" has said that the dissenting opinion of Davis, J., in the Gillette
Case does not contradict the doctrine'of the Perry County Case, 
as
it is cited by Price, J., in the Gillette Case. It is important to recog-
nize that the Perry County Case is still good law in Ohio 
because
of the bearing of thaf decision upon the cases of Clegg 
v. Dearden
and National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co.
Vortunately, the above somewhat labored vindication of the 
Perry
County Case, as cited by Price, J., in the Gillette Case, is now un-
necessary, as the Ohio court has since re-established the validity 
of
the decision in the Gillette Case. In the case of Bowers v. Santee"'
the facts were that the plaintiff sustained a fracture of her 
leg, on
December 29, 1913, and the defendant,, a surgeon, set the 
broken
limb. The surgeon continued his treatment until May, 
1914. An
action for malpractice was begun- in April, 1915, more than 
a year
from the date of the fracture but less than a year from the 
date the
patient was discharged. The Court, Wanamaker, J., said in 
decid-
ing the case, "If McArthur v. Bowers, (supra), was rightly decided,
we still hold that under the allegations of the petition the statute 
of
limitations did not begin to run until May, 1914. We, however,
most respectfully disagree with and disapprove the McArthur 
Case
and we approve and reaffirm the doctrine in the Gillette Case." 
This
last decision was concurred in by five other justices, ,but with Nichol,
C. J., expressing dissent. The Ohio court gives no reasons for 
this
final decision, but it is submitted that it is quite in accord with 
the
theory offered in this paper.
The decision in the Perry County Case is directly contrary to the
decision of the English court in the case of Clegg v. Dearden,
(supra), on the same state of facts. The English court, in this last
" Palmer v. Humiston (913), 87 Oh. St. 4oi, 4o8. Cf. also Railroad v.
Commissioners, 31 Oh. St. 338, 351. "The obligation to restore is 
* * * a
continuing condition, * * * against the right to insist upon the performance
of which no lapse of time is available." It should be noted also that the mal-
practice case of Palmer v. Humiston involves injury to the person of a pri-
vate person. The Ohio court thus seems to have adopted the principle
decided in Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 31 Oh. St. 338, and in Perry Co.
v. Railroad Co., 43 Oh. St. 451, both of which involved injury to a public
person, as equally applicable whether the plaintiff be a public or a private
person.
o99 Oh. St. 361 (1919). Mr. Joseph A. Yager, of the Toledo Bar, called
my attention to this decision after this paper was ready for the press.
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case, decided that leaving the hole in the plaintiff's mine was not a
wrong from which a new cause of action would arise. It also said
that there was no "continuing obligation" on the defendant to pre-
vent the flow of water into the plaintiff's mine, but the court gave no
reason for this conclusion, contenting itself with the statement that
"the plaintiffs have not alleged any such obligation * * * nor is
their action founded on a breach of any such duty." The Michigan
court, on the other hand, in the case of The National Copper Co. v.
The Minnesota Mining Co., while following the case of Clegg v.
Dearden as a precedent, simply adopted without discussion the doc-
trine of that case, on the point that the hole was not a continuing
trespass, but argued at greater length the other question as to
whether "the flowing of the water through the opening" was a new
trespass, and decided that it was not. The joint result of the Eng-
lish case and of the Michigan case is then that neither the leaving of
the hole in the mine wall nor allowing the water to flow into the
mine gives the plaintiff a cause of action, if the facts are presented
to the court in the same way as they were in the Michigan case. If,
however, a "repeated wrong" rather than a "continuous trespass"
should be alleged as the gist of the action, the Michigan court would
decide in favor of the plaintiff, as is shown in the recent case of
Gregory v. Bush37 in which the court said, "one cannot collect and
concentrate * * * waters and pour them through an artificial ditch
in unusual quantities upon his adjacent proprietor." And in the
case of Hurdman v. N. E. Ry. Co.8 8 the English court said that "if
any one by artificial erection on his own land causes water, even
though arising from natural rainfall only, to pass into his neighbor's
land and thus substantially to interfere with his enjoyment, he will
be liable." In the National Copper Co. Case the owners of the Min-
nesota Mine, by allowing the surface of their mine to cave in, had
diverted the surface water, falling upon their land and therefrom
naturally passing over the surface of the National Mine, in such a
way as to throw it into the neighboring mine, to its serious detriment,
and a new right of action would arise for each successive flooding,
even though the right of action for the original trespass in breaking
through the wall was barred by the statute. It should be noted that
this solution of the difficulty by the well established principles re-
(1887) 64 Mich. 44. See also Yerek v. Eineder (x8g9), 86 Mich. 28.
"C. of A. (1878), L. R., C. P. D. 168.
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lating to surface and percolating waters does not invoke the doctrine
of the cases that deal with the intent with which the water is col-
lected and with subsequent negligence in keeping it. The law of
surface and percolating waters deals with an absolute liability, not
with the question of intent or negligence.
It would seem that the confusion in the results depends in the
main upon the use with varying connotation of three terms; namely,
4i) continuing trespass, (2) continuing obligation, (3) repeated
wrong. The case of Clegg v. Dearden, (supra), decides that keeping
the hole open was not "a continuation of the trespass." In the
National Copper Co. Case, (supra), the Michigan court approves
and follows this decision. This is undoubtedly right, if by "trespass"
we mean intrusion upon one's possession. A hole in the wall cer-
tainly does not fall in this category. But the Ohio court in the case
of Perry County v. Railroad Co. (supra), decided that it was the
duty of the defendant to fill up the hole in the road caused by the
destruction of the bridge, that this duty was "a continuing obliga-
tion", and that each day's failure to perform this duty was "a fresh
breach of such obligation", i. e., a-new wrong. If then the allega-
tion in the English case or in the Michigan case had been, that the
leaving of the hole was a "continuing wrong", the plaintiff would
have succeeded 3 9 It has been shown above
40 that the decision of the
Ohio court in Perry County v. Railroad has not been overturned by
the decision in Gillette v. Tucker, as affirmed in McArthur v. Bowers,
and we may assume that the Ohio court still believes the hole, as a
continuing wrong, gives rise to a continually recurring new cause of
action. But, furthermore, the final decision of the Ohio court in
Gillette v. Tucker, as affirmed in McArthur v. Bowers, may be called
in question on the facts. The sponge left in the wound is a fresh
source of harm each day and we thus have in this case a "repeated
wrong", a repeated trespass to the person, which no court has ever
denied gives rise to a new cause of action on each repetition.
4 The
case of Lewey v. Fricke Coal Co. (supra) ,42 although apparently
"It should be noted that in the English case the action was in case and
not in trespass. The allegation should therefore have been construed as an
infringement upon a right, not as an intrusion upon possession.
"Cf. Note 36, supra.
'Perkins v. Trueblood (Cal., May, 1919), 183 Pac. 642; 18 Mica. L.
Rzv. 679.
"Cf. Note 26, supra.
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decided on the "equitable rule that the statute of limitations runs
only from the discovery" really belongs in the class of "repeated
wrongs", the wrong being the concealment of the fraud from day
to day. The same may be said of the cases decided under statutes
that do not bar the action, if the defendant fraudulently conceals
from the plaintiff that there is a cause of action.
The law then finally seems to be as follows: the English court
and the Michigan court have decided that leaving the hole is not a
"continuing trespass". The Ohio court has decided that leaving the
hole is "a continuing wrong" and this decision is left untouched by
the later Ohio decisions, which, though apparently contradictory, are
decided on a different state of facts. The malpractice cases may all
be construed as cases of "repeated wrong" for which no court denies
a recovery. Furthermore although the original Michigan case decides
that the flowing of the water is not "a continuing trespass", the same
court has later declared tht the throwing of water upon an adjacent
proprietor is a wrong, for which a fresh cause of action will arise as
often as it is "repeated". In the use by the courts of the three terms
above cited; namely, (i) continuing trespass, (2) continuing obliga-
tion, (breach of which is a continuing wrong), (3) repeated wrong,
it will be observed that there is first a confusion of trespass in its
original sense .with that in the broader sense of wrong, and then a
further confusion of "continuing" in its ordinary sense with that in
the different sense of "repeated". It would then seem to be good
legal tactics for the plaintiff in every such case to allege a "repeated
wrong" and not a "continuing trespass", and this irrespective of'
whether the wrong be a trespass to land, as in the mining casesP
4
an intrusion upon one's personality as in the malpractice cases,"4 or a
wrong to reputation as in the slander or libel cases.45 The pons
asinorum of continuous trespass could thus be avoided and a re-
covery assured in each case.
It should be said in conclusion that the criticisms here offered are
not strictures on the courts but rather on the lawyers. The trouble
arises from bad pleading. It would be impossible for the Michigan
'Clegg v. Dearden and Williams v. Pomeroy, Note 22, supra; National
Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co., Note 32, supra.
"Gillette v. Tucker, Note 24, supra; Perkins v. Trueblood, Note 29, supra.
'Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (iq95), 86 Wash. 211. Cf. i8 MIce.
f. R v. 6,9.
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court to come to any other conclusion than the one arrived at in the
National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co. on the case as it was
presented to the court. Furthermore, the errors in the decision, if
they be such, have all been corrected by the courts themselves in
subsequent cases; and in the handling of the same questions, if they
-should arise in these courts again, the later cases may be given their
proper stress.
JOSEIPH H. DRAxE.
University .of Michigan Law School.
